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The fact that this is the 7th edition of Lun-
destad’s famous book in less than a ten year 
period of time confirms that it deserves 
all the superlative marks it has received. 
There is no need to repeat well known as-
sessments about this brilliant textbook on 
the contemporary world and a masterful 
overview of international politics. Any at-
tempt to assign further compliments would 
just reaffirm what was already said. It is 
enough to say that, in a way, this is an in-
dispensable book for all students of inter-
national relations, world politics and con-
temporary international history. 
It is amazing that all important events 
and developments of the Cold War and 
Post-Cold War era have been mentioned, 
described and more or less properly con-
textualized in little more than 300 pages. 
The plain, linear, omniscient narration of 
the book stands in bright contrast both to 
commonly perceived uncertainties of our 
time and to dominant fashionable post-
modernist, post-positivist, and construc-
tivist manners of theorizing international 
politics and history. For Lundestad there 
is no need to develop any explicit theory 
of international history. Also, contrary to 
widespread practice in the contemporary 
social sciences, he does not explore the 
ontological and epistemological status of 
his assertions and historical knowledge in 
general. He simply tells his story on con-
temporary history very often without re-
laying on sources that would support it. It 
is assumed that the permissiveness of his 
saying corresponds to the intersubjectivity 
of verifiable facts. 
In that respect Lundestad reminds me 
of Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andrić. Which-
ever Andrić novel you read, you feel that 
you are reading the same book each time. 
Besides the simple fact that he wrote all 
those books, nothing indicates that he was 
somehow personally interested in, or per-
sonally involved in, or intimately invested 
in Bosnian affairs. His neutral, calm narra-
tion provides a compelling description of 
Bosnia in the Ottoman Empire where life 
was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. 
Likewise, Lundestad’s books on contem-
porary international history use the ubiqui-
tous observer’s objectivistic discourse to 
present tectonic changes of international 
relations system, global economic uncer-
tainty, clashes of civilizations, political 
and theoretical dilemmas, and the ravages 
of war in our time. Needless to say, he is 
as successful in the realm of contemporary 
international history as Andrić was in lite-
rature.
One of examples of the ease by which 
some of the most dramatic events have 
been described is the section “Barack 
Obama and the Greater Middle East”. The 
historical election of the first black presi-
dent in the US and all the great expecta-
tions regarding fundamental changes of 
American foreign and internal politics are 
elaborated in only a few sentences. “The 
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need for international cooperation and 
negotiation was emphasized, often in the 
most inspiring terms. The war on terror 
was downplayed. A new environmental 
policy was introduced; Guantanamo was 
to be closed; torture was to end” (133). But 
simultaneously all those expectations and 
announcements are evaluated by a highly 
relativizing remark: “There was little rea-
son to believe that he could live up to these 
expectations” (132-133). In the same style 
he stated that “no one could be certain 
what would be the political future of Af-
ghanistan” (133). The Arab Spring “came 
as a surprise”. Stressing the opinion that 
it is beyond the powers even of the Uni-
ted States to be the absolute demiurge of 
all global, regional and local affairs, Lun-
destad laconically ends the section: “Most 
conflicts had their own local causes, not 
always easily influenced by outsiders” 
(134). This implies that at least some of 
America’s attempts to influence the inter-
nal affairs of different countries have been 
unsuccessful, but Lundestad does not want 
to try to find out why. It would be challeng-
ing to try to define what conditions should 
be in place for foreign interference to be 
deemed successful. Obviously, Lundestad 
was not tempted to give advice about the 
best possible policies.
This is perfectly in line to his reasoning 
on the Vietnam War. Although he elabo-
rates on the Vietnam War in much more 
detail (87-93), his final conclusion is basi-
cally the same as that in the more recent 
case of the Arab Spring. Not the global 
confrontation of two superpowers nor 
America’s military, economic and politi-
cal strength, nor the personalities of Ame-
rica’s leaders or domestic and international 
public opposition to the war played crucial 
roles, but “local conditions proved to be 
decisive” (93). He lucidly notes that deva-
stating bombings of Vietnam and neigh-
boring countries did not seriously influ-
ence Soviet-American relations. Contrary 
to American expectations that Moscow 
would postpone the Brezhnev-Nixon sum-
mit in May 1972 “Moscow was prepared 
to carry out the scheduled talks, which 
would actually represent one of the ze-
niths of the policy of detente” (91). Typi-
cally, Lundestad hesitates to draw a clear 
conclusion. In his opinion, no one can say 
whether the policy of détente would have 
been carried further if there had not been 
the Vietnam War “but at least Vietnam did 
not prevent détente in any way” (91).
The end of the Cold War is still subject 
to many conflicting interpretations. Lun-
destad presents some of them. The trium-
phalist interpretation sees president Rea-
gan with his strong anti-communist stances 
as the most credited for the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Others put Regan’s policies 
in the context of the strategy of contain-
ment which was the permanent feature of 
American grand strategy from Truman to 
Reagan. Some historians see the end of the 
Cold War as a result of American policies, 
on one hand, and the internal changes of 
Soviet politics and economy initiated and 
implemented by Mikhail Gorbachev, on 
the other. And finally, there are the authors 
who give all credit for ending the Cold 
War to Gorbachev. His personal popularity 
in Western Europe was higher than presi-
dent Reagan’s popularity. The dissatisfac-
tion of some Russian intellectuals with the 
fact that the end of the Cold War brought 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but did 
not bring full democracy to former Soviet 
republics is quite understandable. Lun-
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destad comes to the conclusion that “it is 
too early to develop a truly historical per-
spective to the end of the Cold War” (112). 
He pleads for deeper investigation of real 
economic, political and social causes of 
historical events instead of holding a fasci-
nation with individuals. Providing a brief 
overview of Soviet-American summits 
and dramatic changes in Eastern Europe 
from elections in Poland to the demolition 
of the Berlin Wall and the fall of Ceau-
sescu, Lundestad comes to a somewhat re-
signing statement: “It is easier to describe 
the dramatic changes in the climate be-
tween East and West than to explain them” 
(115). But, he certainly does not give up 
on any attempt to explain what happened 
and why. One of his interesting notes treats 
the importance of the Helsinki process, 
which encouraged human rights activists 
all around Eastern Europe and in the So-
viet Union to seek from their governments 
the implementation of adopted documents. 
“There is a direct line from certain sections 
of the Helsinki Act of 1975 to the collapse 
of the regimes in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope in 1989” (116).
The turbulent contemporary history, es-
pecially after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 
and the excessive American reaction with 
the launching of the global war on terror 
on an extremely unilateralist basis, has in-
duced serious temptations among interna-
tional relations theorists and historicists to 
be more interested in detecting trends and 
predicting the global future than in collect-
ing and explaining facts. Traditional al-
lies were concerned by George W. Bush’s 
radical shift from the previously declared 
– although not always truly implement-
ed – multilateralism of all Cold War and 
Post-Cold War American administrations. 
Adopting a strategy of preventive war 
has provoked further concerns about real 
American intentions. Numerous scholars 
have come to the conclusion that what 
the world was actually witnessing was the 
transformation of American hegemony 
into an American Empire. Neoconserva-
tive ideologists have been delighted by the 
fact that America has finally decided to 
exploit this unipolar moment. From their 
point of view the time has come to spread 
democracy all around the world even if it 
implies the forceful changing of undemo-
cratic regimes. The Iraq War in 2003 was 
thought to only be the first stage in the im-
plementation of their extremely ambitious 
plans. Liberals and realists started to warn 
that overstretching resources would not 
only compromise the American imperial 
ambitions, but could lead to the collapse 
of democracy and the American constitu-
tional system. Lundestad is not seduced by 
the speculation of international relations 
theorists. Although in line to his convic-
tion that it is too early to amount definitive 
historical judgments, he nevertheless gives 
some interesting interpretations of that rift 
among Atlantic allies. By the fact that 
the Cold War was over and that the terror 
threat could not serve as equally cohesive 
factor as global ideological confrontation 
did in the past, Lundestad explains dis-
agreements between America and Eu-
rope: “Dominant forces of the two sides of 
the Atlantic had divergent views on how 
acute the threat was and how it should be 
countered. The United States had become 
more unilateralist, while the EU had be-
come even more determined to define its 
own identity – for many also vis-à-vis 
the United States” (198). Europe cheered 
when Barack Obama was elected presi-
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dent, “The United States, which have been 
perceived as an increasingly conservative 
country, had elected a black president. The 
negative image of the US that had devel-
oped virtually all over Europe was trans-
formed almost overnight. Theories about a 
transatlantic rift were largely abandoned. 
The emphasis was now on cooperation” 
(199). Of course, it could be only a mat-
ter of speculation to try to imagine what 
would happen if Obama had not been 
elected. Would the deeper historical forces 
direct European-American alliance toward 
cooperation or further divergences? Bear-
ing in mind the current Ukrainian crisis it 
is legitimate to ask the question, is the sup-
port of a violent change of government in 
Ukraine and the imposition of economic 
sanctions against Russia an expression of 
the American-European cooperation based 
on mutually recognized interests or is it the 
result of more or less open American pres-
sure?
A new section on population, gender 
and environment has been included in 
this edition. In the manner of a truly com-
petent and well informed journalist Lun-
destad comprises the discussion on all of 
those issues on little more than one page. 
Evidently, he is not impressed by the huge 
amount of feminist literature on practically 
all the relevant topics of social, political 
and international developments. Feminism 
de facto redefines the traditional forms of 
conceptualization of any sphere of human 
activity by insisting on the crucial rele-
vance of gender for all human approach-
es and endeavors. Leaving aside those 
highly controversial ambitions of feminist 
authors, Lundestad just provides simple 
facts as, for instance, the gender disba-
lance in China and India “due to the treat-
ment [women] receive not only through 
abortions but also after they are born” (305). 
He simply states, without any comment, 
that “female illiteracy is still a major prob-
lem in some Sub-Saharan countries and in 
parts of South Asia” (305). He obviously 
does not think that any additional explana-
tion is needed to the information that in 45 
developed countries girls outnumber boys 
in secondary schools and in as many as 60 
countries female students are more nume-
rous than men. Some of the most difficult 
dilemmas of our time are briefly resolved 
by common sense, such as the statement 
that “rising living standards could create re-
source shortages” (305) or the opinion that 
“the close link between economic growth 
and greenhouse gas emissions needs to be 
severed for human development to become 
truly sustainable” (306). Skeptics might 
think that it would be too late for the Earth 
to wait for historicists to come to their final 
conclusions on those issues.
Although Lundestad insists that it is ne-
cessary to detect deeper social, economic 
and political structures to be able to un-
derstand historical trends, sometimes it 
seems that he himself is not ready to dig 
too deep under the surface. Where some-
body would expect definitive answers, 
Lundestad gives presumptions, or opens 
new questions. But, he is consistent in 
his insistence that the only remaining su-
perpower cannot establish absolute con-
trol over all local intrastate and interstate 
conflicts. What any foreign interference 
can achieve is limited by local conditions, 
“[a]nd the roots of the conflicts were al-
most always local; the problems, therefore, 
were not easily resolved by outsiders, not 
even by Obama’s United States” (199). 
Lundestad is fully aware that no country 
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can remain the number one power forever. 
“This would definitely appear to be against 
the laws of history, to the extent that such 
laws exist” (329). It seems that certain po-
litical divisions among American political 
elites could seriously contribute to a rapid 
loss in the US’s reputation and influence in 
international affairs. Somehow surprising-
ly, in that respect Lundestad does not feel 
a need for historical distance to state that 
Republicans are permanently trying “to do 
almost everything they can to oppose the 
President, and this in the most difficult of 
economic times. When the President is not 
able to pass the mild version of gun legis-
lation, even with 90 per cent support from 
the people, this leads to widespread cyni-
cism. The outcome is clearly detrimental 
also to the position of the United States in 
the world. When the president is unable to 
really lead the United States, he definitely 
cannot lead the world” (329).
But at the same time Lundestad calls 
for caution toward numerous predictions 
based on current economic trends that Chi-
na will outrun the US in the near future. He 
reminds us that almost nobody predicted 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the 
same time the 1970s and 1980s brought 
many apocalyptic predictions of the fall of 
America as a leading power. Contrary to 
those predictions the US has remained the 
sole world superpower since the end of the 
Cold War. Simultaneously to predictions 
that the US is going to lose its predomi-
nant economic position there are alterna-
tive predictions that, thanks to new tech-
nologies in the exploitation of shale oil and 
gas, the “United States might go back to 
the dominant position it had in the 1950s 
and 1960s” (330).
This book presents a comprehensive 
overview of contemporary political and 
economic world history. Every top-level 
event from 1945 to the present has found 
its place on the pages of this impressive 
book. Anybody who is interested in inter-
national politics and history can use it as 
a perfectly reliable manual. But, if anyone 
believes that this book provides a univer-
sal instrument for an unmistakable inter-
pretation of past events and a prediction of 
the global future, then she or he is missing 
Lundestad’s main message. He is constant-
ly warning that even superpowers make 
mistakes by neglecting the numerous dif-
ferences all around the world, and the 
causes and outcomes of historical events 
cannot be adequately understood without 
the detailed analysis of local conditions. 
There is no automatism of history, “the 
many different local factors will always 
remain crucial. In other words, we can all 
make a difference” (323). Such a wise con-
clusion together with many clever remarks 
scattered throughout the entire book fully 
confirms Lundestad’s reputation as superi-
or intellectual, a label acquired a long time 
ago when he came up with the expression 
“empire by invitation” to label European-
Atlantic integration and American hege-
mony after 1945.
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